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CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
,VOLUME XXX NOVEMBER, 1944 NuMBER 2
ON RELATIVE SOVEREIGNTYt
HANS AUFIUCHT
I. RELATIVE Vs. ABSOLUTE SOVEREIGNTY
The dogma of sovereignty has repeatedly been attacked by a great num-
ber of international lawyers during the past two or three decades.' Many stu-
dents of the problem have proposed to consider sovereignty not as an
absolute concept, but rather as a relative one.2 In order to clarify the mean-
ing of "relative sovereignty" those basic elements must be sought out which
constitute the underlying relationships implied in the term "relative sov-
ereignty." -
II. DOMEsTIC NORM AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
The term sovereignty may be used in a relative sense with reference to
the question whether "supremacy of law" can be attributed to domestic or
tThis is the first of two installments' under this heading. The second part of this
article will appear in the March issue of the CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY. This article is
part of a study carried on under a grant-in-aid from the Carnegie Corporation, New
York City.-En.
1 See e.g., KELsEN, DAS PROBLEM DER SOUVERXNITXT UND DIE THEORIE DES VOLKER-
RECHTS (1920); Lansing, Notes on World Sovereignty (1921) 15 AM. J. INT. L. 13;
VERDRoss, Dm EINHEIT DES RECHTLICHEN WELTBILDES (1923) ; Politis, Le problime des
limitations de la souveraineti (1925) 6 REcUEm DES COUaS (Hague Academy of Int.
Law) 5; Garner, Limitations on, National Sovereignty in International Relations (1925)
19 Am. POL. SCL REV. 1; BIERLY, THE LAv OF NATIONS (2d ed. 1936) 34 ff.;
KEETON & SCEWARZENBERGER, MAKING INTERNATIONAL LAW WoRB: (1939) c. 4;
Eagleton, Organization of the Community of Nations (1942) 36 Am. 3. INT. L. 229, 234.
2 The relative character of sovereignty has been emphasized, moreover, in GARNER,
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAw (1925) 812. "The task of reconstruct-
ing and increasing the effectiveness of international law raises the question of how
far certain of its existing fundamental bases need to be altered. It is now generally
admitted that certain changes of this character are desirable .... The theories of abso-
lute sovereignty and equality of states which have heretofore been recognized as basic
principles should be definitely eliminated so that law will conform more nearly to the
facts." (Italics supplied). See also EAGLETON, INTERNATIONAL GOVERNMENT (1932) 29.
"Sovereignty is not a unit, which a state either has or does not have; it is a relative
term." Cf. 1 OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAv (5th ed. by Lauterpacht, 1935) 117.
"The very notion of International Law as a body of rules of conduct binding upon States
irrespective of their Municipal Law and legislation implies the idea of their subjection
to International Law and mnakes it impossible to accept their claim to absolute sovereignty
in the international sphere." (Italics supplied). On absolute sovereignty, see SUKIEN-
mcmr, LA SOUVERAINEri DES ETATS EN DROIT INTERNATIONAL MODERNE (1927) 59. See'
also, SHOTWFLL, THE GREAT DECISION (1944) 202. "Absolute, unqualified and unchecked
sovereignty is a conception of anarchy."
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international law; in other words, whether the domestic or the international
norm is supreme.
It is certainly justifiable to speak of a national legal order as the "highest
order" so long as attention is focussed on the sphere of exclusive jurisdic-
tion conferred on a State by international law.3 Within that sphere of juris-
diction the domestic legal order may be supreme notwithstanding the fact
that a wider view may include in a complete system of law the superior,
international law.
The Constitution of the United States, for instance, is called the "supreme
law' 4 or "sovereign" in relation to state constitutions or city charters which
are deemed of a lower level than the Constitution. Most of the questions
arising in domestic law are not affected by international law. Hence, it is
often legitimate to ignore the existence of international law for the sake of
simplicity.5
However, assuming that international law is of a higher level than domes-
tic law it is evident that the sovereignty of the domestic law is not absolute.
On the premise that international law binds individual states, domestic norms
are superior only in regard to subordinate norms, but in principle, inferior
in relation to the superior international norm. Thus, in considering both
domestic and international norms in their mutual relationship, it would
be inconsistent to characterize the international as well as the domestic norm
as supreme.
The superiority of 'international law over and above constitutional law has
been reaffirmed by the Permanent Court of International Justice in its Ad-
visory Opinion No. 23.
3See P. C. I. J., Ser. B, No. 4, p. 23 (1923). "From one point of view it might well
be said that the jurisdiction of the State is 'exchsive' within the liimts fixed by inter-
national law-using this expression in its wider sense, embracing both customary law
as well as particular treaty law."4See the Supreinacy Clause of the U. S. CoNsT. Art. VI, § 2. "This Constitution,
and the Laws which shall be made in pursuance thereof ...shall be the supreme Law
of the Land."
5If in such reasoning the attribute of sovereignty is ascribed to the domestic legal order
it assumes the character of a "neglective fiction." Cf. VAIHINGER, THE PHILOSOPHY OF
"As IF" (Transl. by Ogden, 1924) 16. "I include under this term various methods in
which the deviation from reality manifests itself specifically in the neglect of certain
elements. The factor common to all fictions in this class consists in a neglect of im-
portant elements of reality. As a rule the reason for the formation of these fictions
is to be sought in the highly intricate character of the facts which make theoretical treat-
ment exceedingly difficult owing to their unusual complexity. . . . Since, then, the
material is too complicated and confused for thought to be able to break up into its com-
ponent elements.... Thought makes use of an artifice by means of which it provisionally
and temporarily neglects a number of characters and selects from them the more im-
portant phenomena." /
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. . . a State cannot adduce as against another State its Constitution
with a view to evading obligations incumbent upon it under international
law or treaties in force.6
In this case and in related instances the implied or express doctrine of the
sovereignty of international law means superiority of the international norm
over the domestic norm.7
III. NORM-PERSON RELATIONS
A. Sovereignty and Independence
An entirely different meaning of relative sovereignty is implied if atten-
tion is focussed, not on the relationship between international and domestic
norms, but on the position of the "independent" state in international law.
In this context the term) "independent state" itself requires an explanation,
the more so since the designation "independent" and "sovereign" state are
frequently used as interchangeable.8 Yet, what is meant by "independent"
state is equally open to discussion. It might indicate that a certain legal
entity, usually called state in the sense of international law, is considered in-
dependent of any superior rule. If this interpretation is accepted, the inde-
pendent state is. considered an entirely boundless, supreme unit; in other
words, the absolute highest entity.9
The term "independent state" is also susceptible to another construction,
whereb3, independence would mean only independence from any superior per-
sonal unit, but not independence from law. In this connection it may be re-
called that the feudal period of history was characterized by a struggle for
the highest rank within the feudal hierarchy of persons.' 0 The fight for
GTreatnent of Polish Nationals and other Persons of Polish Origin or Speech in
the Danzig Territory, P. C. I. J., Ser. A/B, No. 44.7See The International Law of the Future: Postulates, Principles and Proposals (Supp.
1944) 38 Am. J. INT. L. 41, 73. See also Kunz, The International Law of the Future(1944) 38 Air. POL. ScI. REv. 354, 358.8Cf., dissenting opinion of Judge Anzilotti in Customs Regime between Austria and
Germany, P. C. I. J., Ser. A/B, No. 41, p. 57 (1931). "Independence as thus under-
stood is really no more than the normal condition of States according to international
laws--it may also be described as sovereignty (suprema potestas) or external sov-
ereignty by which is meant that the state has over it no other authority than that
of international law." See Sdfdriades, Principes giniraux dze droit international de la paix(1930) 34 RECUEIL DES COURs 348. "Et en effet, la notion de l'independence rentre dans
celle de la souverainet6, car on ne saurait comprendre ui ttat souverain que ne serait
pas m~me temps un ttat independant." See also 1 MOORE, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW (1906) 18ff.9See infra p. 145.10For the historical development of this doctrine see SERENI, THE ITALIAN CONCEP-
TION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1943) c. 4; see also BUTLER & MACCOBY, THE DEVEL-
OPmENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1928) 3. Cf. the statement of the Dominican
1944]
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political power, which was waged among a great number of competitive
forces, aimed at the elimination of superior personal units. This, in many
cases, did not, necessarily imply the denial of a superior law.
When, in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, several Italian city states
attained a status of superiorem non recognoscentem, such status meant
superiorern persmiam non recognoscentem, but not necessarily the non-recog-
nition of a higher law. Even Bodin's doctrine of sovereignty has been fre-
quently misconstrued, for it has been overlooked that Bodin's struggle against
the papacy did not lead to the assertion of the absolute sovereignty of
the "Prince"; on the contrary, the subjection of the state to law was still
maintained.11
The idea of a hierarchy of persons as means of legal organization has
been maintained even after the feudal period of history had come to an end.
As for the legal character of, the "supreme" person or the "supreme" persons
in the so-called modern state system two opinions have been advanced. One
tends to combine independence from any superior person with the inde-
pendence from law. This line of argumentation. leads inescapably to the
denial of international law as such, for the independent or sovereign state
is conceived as actually severed from international law.12 According to the
Cajetan: "Faut-il pat ce mot de princes entendre seulment les princes qui n'ont pas de
supirieur? ... Par ce mot de prince, il faut entendre un ftat parfait; tels sont: le Pape,
l'Empereur, un Roi, un Ltat libre, c'est A dire qui n' a pas de superieur, qui est assimilable
un prince." LA DocraINE SCOLASTIQUE Du DROIT DE GuERaa (Transl. by Vanderpool,
1919) 78.
"'Cf. BoDIN, LES SIX LIVRES DE LA REPUBLIQUE (1577) 133. "La puissance absolue
des Princes et seigneuries souveraines, ne s'estend aucunement aux loLx de Dieu, et de
nature." See also Gardot, Jean Bodin: Sa Place parmi les Fondateurs da Droit Inter-
national (1934) 50 RECUEIL DES CouRs 549; SABIN, A HISTORY OF PoLITIcAL THEORY
(1937) 408.
12Brierly criticizes Vattel for having advanced a doctrine of the independence of" the
State which is incompatible with the subjection of the State to international law. See
BRIERLY, op. cit. supra note 1,-at 32. "By making independence the 'natural' state of
nations, he made it impossible to explain or justify their subjection to law." It seems,
however, that Vattel attempted to reconcile the rights of independent States with their
obligations under international law when he wrote: ".. . Nations or sovereign States must
be regarded as so many free persons living together in the state of nature. Proof can be
had from works on the natural law that liberty and independence belong to man by
his very nature, and that they can not be taken from him without his consent . . . the
whole body of the Nation, the State, so long as it hhs not voluntarily submitted to other
men or other Nations, remains absolutely free and independent. As men are subject
to the laws of nature, and as their union in civil society can not exempt them from
the obligation of observing those laws, since ' in that union they remain none the less
men, the whole Nation, whose common will is but the outcome of the united wills df
the citizens remains subject to the laws of nature and is bound to respect them in all
its undertakings. And since right is derived from obligatian, as we have just remarked,
a Nation has the same rights that nature gives to men for the fulfillment of their duties.
We must therefore apply to nations the rules of the natural law to discover what are
[Vol. 30
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other opinion the independent state is considered in its normal relations as
independent of any superior personal unit, but in many respects bound by
superior law. In this legal relationship the independent state does not appear
as entirely boundless, as placed in a sphere of lawlessness, but is considered
in its relation to the controlling international norm.
Hence, the absolute sovereign state would be equivalent to a state type
which could be characterized as independent of any -superior person and
simultaneously independent of any'superior law. Relative sovereignty, on the
other hand, would in this connection indicate the relationship between a state
dependent upon international law, but independent of any superior personal
unit,' 3 at least in its normal relations. In order to visualize this peculiar
legal situation of the state, it has been suggested that the state, in the sense
of international law, be defined as that personal legal unit which is immedi-
ately subject to international law or the imwediate addressee of international
law.14
The legal status of independence has not been reserved to one state
alone; it has been extended to all members of the community of nations of
equal rank. Accordingly it has been repeatedly recognized that the status
of independence represents a certain rank within an underlying hierarchy of
persons. For example, the collective recognition of Greece as an independent
State was styled as follows:
The Courts of Great Britain, France, and Russia, exercising the*
power conveyed to them by the Greek nation, to make choice of a Sov-
ereign for Greece, raised to the rank of an Independent State .... :5
On the whole, all states which are deemed immediate addressees of inter-
national law (vdilkerrechtsundttelbar) are considered of equal rank, a rank,
that is conferred on them by international law and which therefore can be
explained only in terms of international law. When Chief Justice Marshall
their obligations and their rights; hence the Law of Nations is in its origin merely the
Tiaw of Nature applied to Nations." Vattel, The Law of Nations or the Principles
of Natural Law (1758) in THE CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1916) 3 ff.13See dissenting opinion of Judge Anzilotti in P. C. I. J., Ser. A/B, No. 41, p. 57(1931). "The conception of independence regarded as the normal characteristic of
States as subjects of international law cannot be better defined than by comparing it
with the exceptional and, to some extent abnormal class of States, known as 'depend-
ent States.' These are States subject to the authority of one or more other States."
14For the term V61kerrechtsunmittelbarkeit see VERDROSs, DIE VERFASSUNG DER V6L-
KEME~HTSGEMEINSCHAFr (1926) 118. "Die ausschliesslich dem Vblkerrecht untergeord-
neten Staaten nennt man herk~mmlicherweise 'souveriine' Staaten. 'Souverini-
tdt' ist also nur ein anderer Ausdruck ffir die ausschliessliche V6lkerrechtsunmittel-
barkeit." For "immediate addressee of international law" see Aufricht, Personality in
International Law (1943) 37 Am. PoL. Sci. REv. 217, 235.
152 HERTSLET, THE MAP OF EuRoPE BY TREATY (1875) 893.
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once referred to the equality of independent States, he did not look upon
the principle of the equality of states -as self-evident. On the contrary,
he derived it from what he called "general law" when he ruled:
No principle of general law is more universally acknowledged, than
the perfect equality of natiovs. Russia and Geneva have equal rights.16
B. Equality and mutual independence of states
The legal relationship between two or more independent states consti-
tutes another aspect of "relative sovereignty." The mutual independence of
sovereign States has several clearly discernible legal consequences. For ex-
ample, the generally accepted rule of international law, that no State in the
sense of international law17 can be brought by another State before an inter-
national tribunal without its consent, can directly be traced back to the prin-
ciple of the equality or mutual independence of states.' 8 Similarly, an inde-
pendent State is, under customary international law, immune from the juris-
diction of another State.' 9
"Relative sovereignty" in this connection means, therefore, that a definite
rank in the hierarchy of persons confers on these persons mutual rights
and duties which" cannot be claimed by any person of a lower rank.
The principle that States are equal as to certain relations has, at times,
been styled their sovereignty, and the standards of equality before interna-
tional law have been established by international law itself.20
36The Antelope, 10 Wheat. 66, 122 (U. S. 1825). Italics supplied. For the difference
between "equality before the law" and "equality in the sense of legal capacity for rights"
see DICKINSON, THE EQUALITY OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1920) 3, 4, 336.
For "mutual independence," see 1 OPPENHEIM, loc. cit. supra note 2; See also Pallieri
on reciproca independenca, (1938) DiRrrro INTERNAZXONAL PUBBLIco 47.
17For the term "State in the sense of international law" see Kuxz, DIE SiAATEN-
VERBINDUNGEN (1929) 20.
Sp. C. I. J., Ser. B, No. 5, p. 27 (1923). "This rule . . . only accepts and applies a
principle which is a fundamental principle of international law, namely, the principle
of the independence of States. It is well established in international law that no State
can, without its consent, be compelled to submit its disputes with other States either
to mediation or to arbitration, or to any other kind of pacific settlement."
19Cf. LEAGUE OF NATIONS. COMMaITTEE OF EXPERTS FOR THE PROGRESSIVE CODIFICA-
TION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW; see especially the Report by Matsuda on the Competence
of the Courts in regard to Foreign States. "The question whether a State may, in any
respect, be subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of another State is connected with
the rights of the State to independence. . . . As regards acts of its Government and
public administration, a State ought to be-as, indeed it is-entirely immune from the
jurisdiction of another State. . . . There is, however, some difference of opinion when
we come to consider acts accomplished by a State . . . in a ,private capacity." (Italics
supplied). League of Nations Document V, Legal, 1929, V. 9. See also ALLEN, THE
POSITION OF FOREIGN STATES BEFORE NATIONAL COURTS (1933).20 See e.g., the general principles concerning the termination of a Mandate. League
of Nations Document P. M. C. Minutes 20, p. 228ff. See also Evans, The General
Principles Concerning the Termination of a Mandate (1932) 26 AM. J. INT. L. 735, 749.
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In short, "relative sovereignty" as used with reference to the mutual in-
dependence of States is equivalent with the "sovereign equality of States. 21
C. Supranational persons
The assumption that the "independent" state is the absolute highest person
in the underlying hierarchy of persons is frequently at variance with legal
experience. For instance, by submitting an international dispute to an inter-
national court the parties in dispute recognize in principle the superiority
of the international tribunal. ,Accordingly they pledge to accept and to
execute, in good-faith the decision of such a tribunal. 22
As previously indicated the requirement of a special agreement for the pur-
pose of bringing an international dispute before an international tribunal
can be explained by the rule that the sovereign state is "normally" independ-
ent of any superior person.23 However, the status of independence under cus-
tomary law may at any moment be qualified by an international agreement
as evidenced by the practice of international judicial agencies.
An international tribunal is authorized to operate only by virtue of an
agreement between the parties concerned. From this legal situation the
erroneous conclusion that the substantive content of an international award
is entirely dependent upon the will of the parties in dispute has repeatedly
been derived. But it should be remembered that the consent expressed in a
compromis ad hoc, in a general arbitration treaty, or in the adherence to the
optional clause 24 concerning the jurisdiction of the Permanent Court of In-
ternational Justice can, in principle, not be revoked at will.
In short, the supranational character of an international tribunal can be
inferred from its authority to issue rulings addressed to so-called independ-
ent states2 as well as from the binding character of its decisions.
21See Point 4 of the Moscow Declaration of October 30, 1943. "That they recognize
the necessity of establishing at the earliest practicable date a general international or-
ganization, based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all peace-loving States,
and open to membership by all such States, large and small, for the maintenance of
international peace' and security." Cf. Kelsen, The Principle of Sovereign Equality of
States as a Basis for Interzational Organization (1944) 53 YALE L. J. 207.
22See e.g., Article 5 of the special agreement between the United States and the
United States of Venezula in relation to the case of The OrinWco Steamship Company
which reads as follows: "The said Arbitral Tribunal shall, in each case submitted to it,
determine, decide and make its award, in accordance with justice and equity. Its decisions
in each case shall be accepted and upheld by the United States of America and the United
States of Venezuela as final and conclhsive." (Italics supplied). Foir the text of the
protocol see FOI4TES Iutis GENTIUM (5th ed. Bruns), Ser. A, § I, Tomus II, 246, 250.23See supra, note 18.24For the optional clause, see STATUTE OF THE PERMktANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL
JUSTrcE, Art. 36, § 2.25See STATUTE OF THE PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTIcE, Art. 34.
1944]
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It cannot be denied that it is a controversial issue whether or not an inter-
national tribunal enjoys legal personality under international law. Those
authors who are inclined to reserve international personality to independent
states26 are bound to deny the legal personality of international tribunals. 27
By contrast, if an international person is defined as the author or the ad-
dressee of valid international acs, international .tribunals may be included
in this definition.
Advocates of absolute state sovereignty will necessarily disprove both the
supranational character as well as the legal personality of an international
tribunal. Nevertheless, it should be clear that States, though normally the
supreme persons in the hierarchy of persons, are relegated to an inferior
rank the moment they submit their case to an international tribunal. In
international judicial procedures the tribunal and not the parties to an inter-
national dispute appear on the highest level of the hierarchy of persons.
It is' not so easy to ascribe supranational personality to the League of
Nations as, for instance, to the Permanent Court of International Justice.
The League of Nations can be considered as having acted in the capacity of
a supranational person,28 by exercising certain functions. A resolution of the
League of Nations Council, for example, addressed to two or more parties in
dispute, had legal effects upon these parties; wherefore it is proper to say that
in this respect the League had the charactr of a supranational corporate
person.2 9 In general, however, the League of Nations was a society of
nations (SocigtM des nations) rather than a supranatioAal corporate body.
The question whether an international administrative body is of an inter-
national or supranational character cannot be decided once and for all; every
individual case must be scrutinized on its own merits. If an international
adminigtrative agency is authorized to act on behalf of its members 0 and
26Cf. WILSON, HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (3d ed. 1939) "Only states in the
strict sense of the word are recognized as full legal persons in international law."27There are some authors who are inclined to deny the legal personality, of interna-
tional tribunals, but who try at the same time to uphold their authority to issue legally
valid acts. See e.g., Pallieri, op. cit. supra note 17, at 263. Such an approach, however,
is legal mysticism, for it is inconceivable that judicial acts may emanate from an im-
personal entity. If the legal validity of international awards is admitted there is no
reason to deny the legal personality of the agency whence these acts originate. See also
United States of America on behalf of Lehigh Valley Railroad Company, Canadian Car
and Foundry, et. al. v. Germany (Supp. 1939) 33 Am,. J. INT. L. 770.28For the concept of a supranational juristic person see FRANKENSTEIN, 1 INTER-
NATIONALES PRIVATRECHT (1926) 505 ff. Frankenstein applies here the term "iiberstaat-
liche juristische Person."29For actions of the Council under Art. 15, § 6 of the Covenant see RAY, COMEN-
TAME Du PACTE DE LA SOCIfT9 DES NATIONS (1930) 73, 77, 225. For analogous compe-
tences of the Assembly see Art. 15, § 9.3OInternational agencies designed to act on behalf of the community of nations have
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does not require for its actions the unanimous conseit of all its members,
the supranational character of such an agency can, 'with reason, be assumed.
On the other hand, international agencies requiring for their measures the
unanimous consent of the members or the ratification of their acts, or both,
constitute just an association of nations for a more or less definite purpose,
but they cannot be classified as supranational agencies.31
In sum, the term "relative sovereignty" indicates in certain cases the legal
relationship between a supranational agency or supranational person and
an "independent" state.
D. Absolute sovereignty
The doctrine of "relative" sovereignty can also be contrasted with a doc-
trine of "absolute" sovereignty which explicitly denies the validity of inter-
national law and which, by implication, denies the coexistence of states.
In accordance' with the fundamental principle of the National Socialist
jurisprudence, "Law is what is advantageous to the national community"
(Recht ist was der Volksgerneinschaft.niitzt), the German Reich is justified
in disregarding any legal obligation which is incompatible with the real or
alleged advantage of the German nation.3 2 Thus, the virtual independence from
international law can be proclaimed whenever it serves the purpose of the
National Socialists. From this viewpoint, not the international, but the
domestic legal order is paramount, and domestic law prevails whenever a con-
flict between these two legal spheres arises . 3
By denying the validity of supranational law and at the same time ,the
right to equality34 of the individual members of the community of nations,
the National Socialists are apt to support German claims for unrivaled legal
superiority with respect to the rest of the world, unlimited by any legal obli-
gation to international norms or vis-a-vis independent states.
E. Internal sovereignty
"Relative" sovereignty may also mean "internal sovereignty" or, in Bodin's
words; summa potestas in subditos.3 5 In Bodin's system this maxim does not
exclude a legal connection between domestic and international law, it indi-
been called by Verdross: Staatengeineinschaftsorgane. See VERDROS$, V6LKERRECHT(1937) 104.31See Aufricht, Post-War Planning and Limitation of Sovereignty (1944) 38 Am.
J. INT L. 123.32For thii doctrine and its implications see Gott, The National Socialist, Doctrine
of International Law (1938) 32 Am. J. INT L. 708, 709.33See SCAECHER, DEUTSCHES AUSSENSTAATSRECHT (1933) 9, 12, 17.34See supra note 21.35BoDnI, DE REPUBLICA L1BR SEX (1586) Bk. I, c. VIII.
1944]
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cates a legal relationship between constitutional law and domestic agencies
vis-a-vis subordinated legal spheres and organs. Within a state there are
many "legal units" 3-6 on different levels within a hierarchy of legal units.
Accordingly internal sovereignty denotes relative superiority within the
state.37 In the Cayuga Indians the international tribunal held:
So far as an Indian tribe exists as a legal unit, it is by virtue of the
domestic law of the sovereign nation within whose territory the tribe
occupies the land, and so far only as. that law recognizes it.38
This sentence is obviously to be understood as a reference to "relative"
sovereignty within the domestic legal system,3 9 and the relationship between
the nation and the Indian tribe is correctly characterized as a relationship of
two legal units comprised in one system.
F. Sovereignty atnd the private individual
The overwhelming majority of writers on international law 'seem still
inclined to deny to the private individual, legal personality in international
law. One of the reasons for this attitude is presumably the circumstance that'
the private individual is not "sovereign.
40
In general, the private individual is subject to the jurisdiction of the state
in which he resides or travels.4 ' The state, in turn, is bound by customary
international law tor apply certain minimum standards in the treatment of
foreigners. 42 By special agreement, states may even be obliged to adopt
legal measures in behalf of their citizens.43
The subjection of the private individual to the state'" evidenced byis eiecdb
36For the private individual as legal unit see infrai note 40.37See BiFRaYY, op. cit. sapra at note 1, at 36. "In the original theory it was not the
state that was sovereign, but a person or persons within a state that were 'sovereign'
over the rest."38The United States-Great Britain: Arbitration under the Agreement of August 18,
1910 in HUDSON, CASES AND OTHER MATERIALS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW (1929) 12.
(Italics supplied).
39Ibid. "The power which had sovereignty over the land has always been held the
sole judge of its relations with the tribes within its domain." See infra note 50 for terri-
torial sovereignty.40For additional reasons why the private individual is customarily not considered a
person under international law see Aufricht, Personality in International Law (1943)
37 Am. POL. Sci. REV. 217, 229.41See supra; note 35.42See Eagleton Denial of Justice in International Law (1928) 32 Am. J. INT. L.
538; Visscher,'Le Dini de Justice en Droit International (1935) 52 "REcuEIL DES
CouRs 369.43See e.g., the treaties for the protection of European Minorities concluded under the
auspices of the League of Nations after 1919. Text in 1 HUDSON, INTERNATIONAL
LEGISLATION 298, 489, 733.
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many international and domestic rules and practices. For instance, the indi-
vidual is obliged under domestic law to be loyal to his country and, in prin-
ciple, international law does respect the allegiance of the individual to his
country. Thus, even in wartime, an occupying force is not allowed to
compel the inhabitants of an occupied country to swear allegiance to the
invaders. 4 Another example of the dependence of the private individual
upon the state to which it belongs is. the rule that a private individual
has no direct access to international tribunals, unless a special agreement to
this effect provides the right of the private individual to appear before an
international tfibunal. 45
G. Sovereignty and the sphere of domestic jurisdiction
The term "relative sovereignty" is furthermore applied to the sphere of
domestic jurisdiction granted by international law to independent States.
"Relative sovereignty" in this sense means that the scope of the jurisdiction
conferred on the State by international law is not a rigid but an elastic
one.46 This principle is a very sound one and has been reaffirmed by inter-
national tribunals. Thus the Permanent Court of International Justice held:
The question whether a certain matter is or is not solely within the
jurisdiction of a state is an essentially relative question: it depends
upon the development of international relations.47
After World War I it was hoped that progress in international relations
could be achieved by restricting the "domestic jurisdiction" of states and by
transferring several subject-iatters, from domestic jurisdiction into the inter-
national sphere. The Kellogg-Briand pact as well as the treaties for the pro-
tection of minorities, concluded under the auspices of the League of Nations,
can be understood as efforts in this direction. Conversely, the attempt of the
44See Convention (IV.) respecting the laws and customs of war on land. Sikned at
the Hague, October 18, 1907, Art. 45. "Any pressure on the population, to take the oath
to the hostile Power is prohibited." According to 2 OPPENr mI, INTERNATIoNAL LAW,
op. cit. supra note 2, at 351, the occupant is not allowed to compel the inhabitants of the
occupied country "to take an oath of allegiance. . . . On the other hand he may compel
them to take an oath-sometimes called an 'oath of neutrality'-to abstain from taking
up a hostile attitude against him. .. "4USee Sdf6riades, Le probl~me de l'acc~s des particuliers ei des jurisdictions inter-
nationales (1935) 51 RECUEIL DES COnRs 46.
46It is persumably this implication to which Kunz refers when he speaks of the rela-
tive character of sovereignty: "This sovereignty is therefore by no means an absolute
conception, but an essentially relative conception which changes and is bound to change
with the change of the superordinated international law." Kunz, The "Vienna School" of
International Law, (1934) 11 N. Y. U. L. Q. REV. 370, 399. Cf. also, Politis, Le problme
des limitations de la souveraineti (1925) 6 RECUEIL DES COURS 34.
47p. C. I. J., Ser. B, No. 4, p. 24 (1923).
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totalitarian states to rid themselves of such jurisdictional limitations and
to extend the sphere of domestic jurisdiction even into fields hitherto regu-
lated by international law, constitutes a reversal of the preceding progressive
trend in international law.
Nevertheless, it must ie emphasized that there is also a lower limit to
the elasticity of the domestic jurisdiction. The requirements of international
law concerning minimum standards of jurisdictional authority represent such
limits. 48 Whenever the jurisdictional limitations imposed by international
law are extended so far that a State is prevented from fulfilling its obliga-
tions under international law, the State may be threatened in its very exist-
ence and thereby be deprived of any jurisdiction whatsoever. This state-
ment may be illustrated by the following sentence taken from one of the World
Court's Advisory Opinions:
As the Court has had occasion to state in previous judgments' and
opinions, restrictions on the exercise of sovereign rights accepted by
treaty by the state concerned cannot be considered as an infringement of
sovereignty.49
Unfortunately,' this ruling is not unequivocal. Assuming that the terms
"sovereign rights" and " overeignty" are to be understood as identical,
the ruling of the World Court is inconsistent. It is logically untenable to
assert that limitations of sovereign rights do not constitute infringement
of sovereignty. The true intention of the award would probably have been
expressed more clearly by saying, e.g., "that restrictions of the sphere of
domestic jurisdiction do not in themselves impair the international per-
sonality of a state." Any reasoning of this kind seems to invite, however, a
construction a contrario; for restrictions of the sphere of domestic jurisdic-.
tion w6uld be self-defeating should they expose the international personality
of the State to annihilation, since the sovereignty or sphere of domestic juris-
diction of a non-existent legal entity cannot be restricted at all.
IV. SOVEREIGNTY AND SPACE
Every rule of law is related to space. The designation of certain fields
of law as American, English, and so on, implies the space element, for it
indicates not only "national" legal systems but also that portion of the globe
in which a certain set of rules is applicable or: actually enforced.
48See supra note 42.,
40P. C. I. J., Ser. B, No. 14, p. 36 (1927).
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A. Territorial sovereignty exercised by individual states
The right of a state to function within a certain territory, unimpeded by
any interference from the outside, is called territorial sovereignty.50 In the
award, the Island of Palmas (or Miangas), the arbitratbr, Dr. Max Huber,
,construed the nature of territorial sovereignty as follows:
The development of the national organization of states during the
last few centuries, and, as a corollary, the development of international
law, have established this principle of the exclusive competence of the
state in regard to its own territory in such a way as to make it the point
of departure in settling most questions that concern international rela-
tions. The special cases of the composite state, of collective sovereignty,
etc., do not fall to be considered here [sic], and do not, for that matter
throw any doubt upon the principle which has just been enunciated ....
Territorial sovereignty is, in general, a situation recognized and de-
limited in space ....
Sovereignty in the relation between states signifies independence,
independence in regard to a portion of the globe is the right to exercise
therein, to the exclusion of any other state, the functions of a state .... 51
Within the sphere of territorial sovereignty the functions of a state are ex-
ercised through acts of its organs.52 The exclusive right of the functionaries
of State A to act in their official capacity within a definite territory corre-
sponds with the duty of the functionaries of States B, C, D, and so on, to
omit actions reserved to State A. Only with the express consent of State A
are functionaries of States B, C, D, authorized to act in official capacity
within the territory of State A.53
It may be mentioned in passing that the principle of the exclusive terri-
50For the concept of territorial sovereignty, cf. TnE COLLECTED PAPERS OF JOHN
WESTLAXE ON PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw (ed. by Oppenheim 1914) 131; For the
German term "Gebietshoheit," see 4 NEUmEYER, INTERNATIONALES VERWALTUNGSRECHT(1936) 121, 124; for the Italian approach, see FEDozzI, INTRoDuzIoNE AL DnuRo IN-
TERNAZiONALE E PARTE GENERALE (1933) 349.51See The Island of Patnazs (or Miangas), (1928) 22 Am. J. INT. L. 868, 875.52Some authors maintain that the State which exercises territorial sovereignty is
entitled also to dispose of its territory. This approach comes very close to the Roman
and Civil Law doctrines on the positive content of the concept of property. For the
question of whether the relationship between State and territory can be understood in
terms of an international concept of property, see WESTLAKE, 10C. Cd. supra note 50;
See also Donati, Stato e Territorio (1914) 8 RvrSrA DI DInuro INTERNATIONALE 319;
(1923) 15 id. at 349; (1924) 16 id. at 47. Prager, Eigentum und Staatsgebiet (1934)
14 ZEITscHRlrT FUR 6FFENTLICHES REcHa 611. For the so-called "Kompetenztheorie," see
ICELSEN, ALLEGEMEINE STAATSLEHRE (1925) 137.513The actions of diplomatic representatives of State A on the territory of State B
are actions of the own organs of State A within a foreign territorial sovereignty. For
examples of acts of organs of State A on behalf of State B within the territory of State C,
see Sereni, Agency in International Law (1940) 34 Am. J. INT. L. 638, 640.
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torial jurisdiction is also implied in the term "territorial waters," since the
right to exclude foreign functionaries and private individuals is based upon
the territorial "sovereignty" of a state "over a belt of sea round its coast."
5 4
The decisive criterion is here, the "territoriaf sovereignty" of the riparian
State over this part of its territory,- since as a description of a factual
situation, "territorial waters" are a contradiction in terms.
Although "territory" is a typical "attribute" or "element" of an inde7
pendent state, the question has at times been raised whether states or state-
like organizations are conceivable which do not enjoy the prerogatives in-
herent in territorial sovereignty. The dominant doctrine tends to consider
"territory," or at least "stable frontiers," as an indispensable prerequisite
of statehood. Yet, several scholars are willing to recognize, on certain condi-
tions, even nomadic tribes as "States." 56
B. Linitations of territorial sovereignty
The exclusive territorial jurisdiction of a state is, or may be, restricted
with respect to certain matters. Such. limitations of territorial sovereignty
are usually based upon customary international or treaty law.
The outstanding example of customary rules limiting territorial sovereignty
are the rules concerning the immunities- and privileges of diplomatic repre-
sentatives.5 7 These rules constitute noteworthy exceptions to the general
principle that only the functionaries of the receiving State are permitted to
act in official capacity within its territory. The receiving State is bound to
omit the application of certain measures vis-a-vis diplomatic representatives.
For instance, it grants exemptions from taxation 5s and customs duties.59
Moreover, the receiving State is bound to permit within its territory, the
5 4Cf. Second Report submitted to the Concil by the Preparatory Committee for the
Codification Conference. Text in (1930) 24 AM. J. INT. L. 3, 26.55See JESsuP, THE LAw OF TERRITORIAL WATERS AND MARITIME JURISDICTION (1927)
c. 2. Under the heading "Sovereignty over Territorial Waters," Jessup writes as fol-
lows: "It is recognized that the use of the word sovereignty involves difficulties, but
it is here used to denote that exclusive power of disposition and control which each
nation concededly exercises over its land territory." Id. at 116.5 6Reference to the principle of territorial sovereignty is to be found also in the ques-
tionnaire of the League of Nations concerning the admission of new members. See
League of Nations Document A. 91. 1921. VII., p. 3. Question 3 of the questionnaire
reads as follows: "Does the country possess a stable government and fixed frontiers?"
For the issue whether Nomads too might be considered as States, see LAPRADELLE, LA
FRONT Eax (1928) 13. Lapradelle agrees with Kelsen, Thiorie ginirale de l'Atat (1926)
43 REVUE DE DROIT PUBLIC 561, that stable frontiers are by no means an indispensable
prerequisite of state organization.57See BORCHARD, THE DIPLOMATIC PROTECTION OF CITIZENS ABROAD (1913) 25.
5 8See Research in International Law. Harvard Law School. (Supp. 1932) 26 AM. 3.
INT. L. 114. See especially, Art. 22 of the Draft Convention on Diplomatic Privileges and
Immunities, id. at 115.
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performance of official acts on behalf of the sending State by the diplomatic
representatives of the latter.60
The rules concerning diplomatic immunities and privileges can, for the most
part, be traced back to customary international law. However, the scope of
these privileges might be extended or restricted by way of international
agreement. Thus, Article 7, Section 4 of the Covenant of the League of
Nations provides that delegates of the members of the League and officials
of the League shall enjoy diplomatic privileges and immunities when acting
in official capacity. Also, Article 19 of the Statute of the Permanent Court of
International justice extends the same privileges and immunities to the mem-
bers of the Court.61 After World War I there was a conspicuous tendency
to extend diplomatic privileges to new types of international functionaries.
By contrast, insistence on strict construction of the norms concerning diplo-
matic functions is to be encountered in recent agreements. An outstanding
example of this is the Inter-American Convention on Diplomatic Officers,
signed at Habana on February 20, 1928, which expressly provides that
Foreign Diplomatic Officers "should not claim immunities which are not
essential to the fulfillment of their official duties. '62
Another aspect of territorial sovereignty is the right of 'a State to impose
tariffs, since the levy of customs duties is predicated upon the move-
ment of goods from the territory of one State to the territory of another.
Customs autonomy under international law is, no doubt, one of the most
significant features of territorial sovereignty. Although in principle un-
limited,6 customs autonomy is susceptible of limitations which may be brought
about either by unilateral action of one State or by mutual international
agreement.
A unilateral reduction of tariffs by adoption of a lower tariff level 64 does
not in itself constitute a binding limitation on the discretion of the individual
State, since it follows from the principle of customs autonomy that the same
State may raise the tariff level at will. However that may be, the inter-
national effects of a unilateral reduction of tariffs will, for all intents and
purposes, be the same as if the lowering of customs barriers had been attained
59See Art. 20, id. at 107.60See Art. 18, id. at 97.6 1See HUDSON, THE PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE (1943) 145, 313 ff.
621 THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES OF AMERICAN STATES (1931) 420. See also,
Norms Concerning Diplomatic and Consular Functions (1940) 2 id. at 351.03See e.g., LIPPERT, RECHTSBUCH DES INTERNATIONALEN FINZANZRECHTS: CODE OF
INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL LAW (1935) 206, 216, 501.64For the American practice, see TAUSSIG, THE TARIFF HISTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES (8th ed. 1931).
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by concerted action. The typical means by which a mutual tariff reduction
can be achieved are Trade Agreements. The effectiveness of Trade Agree-
ments has frequently been over-estimated for at least two reasons: first, the
reduction-of an autonomous tariff is often more apparent than real, because
the high basic tariff which is reduced by a Trade Agreement might have been
adopted for the sole purpose of improving the bargaining position of the
State or the States which are parties to the agreement ;65 second, the applica-
tion of the mutual advantages 'provided by a Trade Agreement might be
hampered by various devices of administrative protectionism.66
In general, the territory of a state and its customs territory coincide. 67
Yet by mutual agreement, exemptions from this rule have been established.
In a customs union, for instance, customs boundaries are distinct from the
political boundaries proper. The members of a customs union usually main-
tain their 'political frontiefs unchanged while recognizing a "unity of the
customs frontier and of the customs territory vis a zis third States."68
To be sure, a customs union represents a limitation of sovereignty only
with respect to the political entities that are united thereby. As for outsiders,
a customs union may even mean an intensification of economic nationalism
rather than a step towards overall economic cooperation.
Another device of limiting territorial sovereignty is the so-called demili-
tarized zone designed to restrict the territorial sovereignty of a State in
military matters. Demilitarized zones are not necessarily confined to land
frontiers. A regime of this kind may affect natural waterways, coasts,
maritime canals and islands.69
The frontier between the United States and Canada has often 'been re-
ferred to as the outstanding example of a demilitarized land frontier based
upon international agreement. It should be borne in mind, however, that
the mutual renunciation of fortifications ensued in this case by usage rather
than by virtue of any formal international agreement, for the basic conven-
tion, the so-called Rush-Bagot agreement of 181770 regulates only the main-
tenance of naval forces in the Great Lakes district. Even if it is assumed
65For the recent American Trade Agreements Program, see SAYRE, THE WAY FOR-
WARD: THE AMERICAN TRADE AGREEMENT PROGRAM (1939); TASCA, THE RECIPROCAL
TRADE POLICY OF THE UIiITED STATES: A STUDY IN TRADE PHILOSOPHY (1938).66For administrative protectionism, see HEUSER, CONTROL OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE
(1939) and BIDWELL, THE INVISIBLE TARIFF (1939).67Cf. Lippert, op. cit. supra note 63, at 206, 502.
69p. C. I. J., Ser. A/B, No. 41, p. 51 (1931).
69Cf. MARSHALL-CORNWALL, GEOGRAPHIC DISARMAMENT (1935) 57ff.
7OText in I MALLOY, TREATIES, CONVENTIONS, INTERNATIONAL ACTS, PROTOCOLS, AND
AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND OTHER POWERS (1910) 628.
See also, 1 MOORE, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAw (1906) 692.
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that this agreement is still legally vlid-a point which is not beyond doubt 71
-no express mutual obligation can be derived from it as to the demilitariza-
tion of the entire Canadian-United States border, which as a matter of fact
has been upheld for more than a century.
The status of the Canadian-United States border, providing for reciprocal
demilitarization,7 2 served as a pattern for similar regimes which have been
established in Europe. Thus, the Swedish-Norwegian Treaty of October 26,
1905 created a demilitarized zone upon the basis of equality.7 3 The most
elaborate agreement of this kind is apparently the "Convention respecting the
Thracian Frontier" of July 24, 1923.7 4 Under the Convention it was for-
bidden to maintain any permanent fortifications or any depots of arms and
war material within the demilitarized zone. No armed forces were to be
stationed or moved within, or into, this region except those which were
necessary to procure the internal order. No military or naval aircraft of
any flag was allowed to fly through the demilitarized zone.
Whereas the above agreements on geographical disarmament impose a
mutual obligation upon the contracting parties, there are other agreements
which provide only for unilateral demilitarization. Articles 42-44 of the
Treaty of Versailles, regarding the demilitarization of the Rhineland as well
as the corresponding provisions of the TREATY OF LoCARPNO (1925), furnish
perhaps the most significant example of a unilateral territorial demilitarization.
C. Joint Exercise of Territorial Sovereignty
It follows from the general principles concerning territorial sovereignty7 5
that in peacetime76 under customary international law only the organs of
one state are authorized to perform state functions within a given terri-
tory.7 7 By mutual agreement, however, states have occasionally joined hands
as to the exercise of territorial sovereignty.
(1) Coimperium and Condominium.-With reference to specific situa-
tions the joint exercise of territorial sovereignty by two states has been
71See MARSHALL-CORNWALL, op. cit. supra note 69, at 59.2Id. at 57.
73For the text of the Convention of October 26, 1905, see DE MARTENS, NOUVEAU
RECUEiL G9N aI. DES TRArrs, etc., 2d Series (1907) 703. See also, MARSHALL-
CORNvWALL, op. cit. supra note 69, at 84, 88.74Text in (Supp. 1924) 18 Am. J. INT. L. 62.75See supra note 50.76The related problems of military occupation cannot be discussed here. For the inter-
national law of military occupation see OPPEN3HEIX, op. cit. supra note 44.
77Cf. Judge Huber in the Island of Palmas (1928) 22 Am. J. INT. L. 877, "the actual
continuous and peaceful display of state functions is in case of disput the sound and
natural criterium of territorial sovereignty."
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called condominium or coiniperium.78 Although the two terms are usually
'considered as interchangeable it has been proposed to differentiate between
them by reserving the term coiniperium to those situations where joint rights
of administration are conferred, whereas the term condominium would cover
rights of administration plus the right to dispose of a territory.09 In accord-
ance with this distinction the legal status of the Sudan and the New Hebri-
des can be styled a coimperium.
The several agreements between Great Britain and Egypt 0 concerning
the Sudan are designed to regulate, above all, the administration of the
Sudan; but the agreement does not regulate the right of the contracting
parties to cede the territory of the Sudan.
The joint exercise of the administration is emphasized time and again in
these conventions. The treaty of alliance between Great Britain and Egypt
(1936) provides for example: "The Governor General [of the Sudan] shall
continue to exercise oi. the joint behalf of the High Contracting Parties the
powers conferred upon him by the said agreements." 8' Similarly, the pro-
tocol respecting the New Hebrides concluded between Great Britain and
France on August 6, 191482 contains elaborate provisions on the administra-
tion of the New Hebrides. Yet, it is silent on the question of who is ulti-
mately authorized to cede the territory of the New Hebrides. On the whole,
so long as the issue of the final disposal of the territory over which a
coimperium i" instituted is in abeyance or not sufficiently clarified in the re-
lated documents, it appears preferable to characterize the status of the Sudan
and the New Hebrides as coimperium rather than as condominium.
(2) International Lease.-The lease of territory under international law
may in certain cases involve a joint exercise of territorial sovereignty.8 3
A state which acquires a lease on foreign territory for but a limited pur-
pose is entitled to exercise those rights of territorial jurisdiction which are
expressly conferred by the underlying agreement. In all other respects the
lessor retains the rights of jurisdiction implied in "territorial sovereignty"
since, according to a well established principle of international law, a
7SFor an enumeration of historic examples of condominium see KUNz, DIE STAATEN-
VERBINDUNGEN (1929) 278.
79Cf. VEauROSS, V6LKERRECHT (1937) 132.80See Agreement between Great Britain and Egypt of January 19, 1899 in (1898-1899)
91 BrrIsH AND FOREIGN STATE PAPERS 19; For the agreement of July 10, 1899 see
id. at 21.81See Great Britain Treaty Series No. 6 (1937) Cmd. 5360. Cf. in this connection:
"Nothing in this article iirejudices the question of sovereignty over the Sudan." Ibid.82For text see 12 MARTENS, NOUVEAU RECUELL GfNfRAL DE TAIaT-s (3d ser.) 189.8 3See BATY, THE CANONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1930) 404. See also, WILSON,
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (3d ed. 1939) 93.
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limitation of sovereignty is not to be presumed.8 4  In international state
practice there are many instances of limited purpose leases. Especially in
the course of World War II has the United States concluded several agree-
ments to this effect. By the Hull-Lothian Agreement of September .2, 1940,
for example, the United States has acquired from Great Britain leases for
the immediate establishment and use of naval and air bases in the Western
Hemisphere for a period of ninety-nine years. Within the territories enu-
merated in this agreement the United States is authorized to exercise all
powers "necessary to provide access to and defense of such bases and appro-
priate provisions for their control."8' 5
By contrast, the Hay-Varilla Convention of 190386 has granted to the
United States exti~emely broad discretionary powers in regard to the Panama
Canal zone. By virtue of this convention the United States enjoys, without any
time limit, all the attributes of sovereignty necessary for the construction,
maintenance, and protection of the Canal. To be sure, Panama preserves the
"titular sovereignty, 87 that is to say, the Panamian government did not
grant the territory as such8 , in perpetuity.
In legal situations where the lessee is authorized to proceed as if he would
enjoy complete territorial sovereignty, 9 it may be misleading to speak of
joint exercise of territorial sovereignty, since the jurisdiction of the lessor is in
these cases virtually dormant. Under the circumstances the statement that
"Sovereignty may be retained by the lessor state, even though complete
jurisdiction be granted to the lessee," 90 may mean: either that the dormant
84See P. C. I. J., Ser. A, No. 24, p. 12 (1930). "In case of doubt a limitation of sov-
ereignty must be construed restrictively."
85U. S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE. EXECUTIVE AGREEMENT SERIES No. 181. For the
question of the constitutionality of this agreement see MCCLURE, INTERNATIONAL AGREE-
MENTS (1941) 395 ff. For additional instance of limited purpose leases see WiLsON,
op. cit. supra note 83, at 93 ff.86 Text in 33 STAT. 2234 (1903).
87See Mr. Taft's statement in PADELFORD, THE PANAMA CANAL IN PEACE AND WAR
(1942) 50, n. 35.88 1d. at 47. It is a controversial issue whether or not the United States has leased the
territory of the Canal zone. Professor George Grafton Wilson ostensibly considers the
legal status of the United States in the Canal zone as based upon a lease. See WILsoN,
op. cit. supra note 83, at 95. Professor Padelford jn his monograph on the Canal Zone
states: "It is notable that Panama did not cede, sell, or lease the territory for the Canal
zone. ... op. cit. supra note 87, at 45 ff. Mr. Alfaro in his letter (January 3, 1923)
to Secretary Hughes wrote as follows: "It is proper to remark that the zone has not
been sold, transferred, or alienated by the Republic of Panama to the United States in
full ownership . . . the Canal zonw has not even been leased to the United States."
2 U. S. FOREIGN RELATIONS (1923) 645. (Italics supplied).8 9Assuming that the Panama Canal Zone has been leased to the United States, the
Canal Zone would be a case in point.9 0 See WILSON, op. cit. supra note 83, at 95.
1944]
CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
rights of the lessor may or will be revived at a later date; or that the lessee
is not entitled to cede, ,sell, or otherwise dispose of the leased territory, but
that these rights are reserved to the lessor.
(3) Sovereignty Over the Air Space.-The current discussion on "free-
dom of the air" entails to a certain extent problems of joint exercise of terri-
torial sovereignty.
Under customary international law every state has complete 'and exclusive
sovereignty over the air space above its territory.91 By mutual agreement this
rule can be modified and a state may grant to another the right of using
its air space.92 Actually, a great number of international agreements furnish
evidence of limitations of sovereignty over the air space.93
In theory the following main types of legal relationships between states
concerning air sovereignty are conceivable: (1) State A excludes State B
from its air space; (2) State A grants to State B equal rights within the ter-
ritory of State A ;94 (3) State A acquires from State B by reciprocal agree-
ment the same rights which State B acquires in the territory of State A ;95
(4) State A grants State B virtually all essential rights and retains just the
so-called nudum jus at its air space.
Moreover, the bilateral agreement between States A and B may be an ex-
clusive one, that is to say, only State B acquires rights vis-a-z'is State A;
or the bilateral agreement may be just one among several agreements of an
identical or similar content.96
Now, whenever State A, without acquiring corresponding rights from
State B, grants to State B rights of innocent passage, emergency lendings,
service landings, or commercial landings,97 such practice obviously implies
joint exercise of the sovereignty over the air space of State A by States A
and B. Also, in case reciprocal rights are granted, the contracting parties are
authorized to exercise jointly the'sovereignty over the air space of States A
and B.9 8
At all events, if International Air Transport is to be encouraged after the
91 See Art. 1 of the Convention on the Regulation of Aerial Navigation. Opened for
signature at Paris, October 1919. LEAGUE OF NAIONS. TREATY SmEs 173. -This article'
merely codifies a generally recognized principle of international law.92See Art. 15, § 3 of the above Convention.93For a discussion of the nature of these conventions see LissiTziN, INTERNATI1NAL
AIR TRANSPORT (1942) 366.94For these rights, see Universities Committee on Post-War' International Problems.
Problen XIII. International Air Traffic after the War by Kenneth Colegrove, p. 11.
95Ibid.96See LIssITZIN, op. cit. mpra note 93, at 366.97See mpra note 94.98See supra note 94.
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cessation of hostilities, international agreement concerning the joint exercise
of sovereignty over the air space will have to be reached.
By and large, governments and business aiming at the expansion of Inter-
national Air Transport will attempt to counteract the still prevailing ten-
dency of individual states to retain the exclusive jurisdiction over their air
space. Conversely, individuals and states for whom military security is the
prime consideration will in all probability insist on exclusiveness usque ad
coel u. 99
V. SOVEREIGNTY AND TIME
A. Time and international personality
The exercise of the functions of an independent state is limited in time as
well as in space. It may suffice to illustrate this statement by reference to
the recognition or non-recognition of independent States, for it is one of the
purposes of the recognition of a Stafe, to ascertain the beginning or the end
of an independent State. The time element is of great importance especially
with respect to foreign State acts, since the validity of legal acts is con-
tingent on space and time. The true functioft of a de jure recognition con-
sists in officially declaring the moment in which a new State assumes its
normal functions under international law.
The need for exactly determining the time factor has also been emphasized
in the recommendation of the Institute of International Law, which would
require, in any de jure recognition, an indication of the date when a new
State begins to exist.10 0
While it is one of the functions of the recognition of a State to confirm in
a formal manner the legal existence of an independent State, it might be
one of the purposes of non-recognition to uphold the legal validity of acts
of a State whose existence is disputed.' 0 ' If the Stimson doctrine, for in-
stance, sets forth the principle of non-recognition with respect to conquest
by force, it implicitly aims at recognizing the authority of the occupied
09Fbr a possible change of the meaning of "Sovereignty usque ad coeho" in connec-
tion with the development of stratosphere or substratosphere flying see LIssiTZiN, op.
cit. spra note 93, at 410.
100Cf. RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY THE INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL LAw, at Brussels,
April 1936 (Supp. 1936) 30 Am. J. INT. L. 185. Art 7. "Recognition de lure is retro-
active in its effects from the date when the new State actually began to exist as an
independent State. It is desirable that this date should be definitely indicated in the act
of recognition."
'
01 For related problems see Borchard, The Unrecognized Government in American
Courts (1932) 26 Am. J. INT. L. 261; See also, Briggs, Relations Oflcieuses and Intent
to Recognize: British Recognition of Franco (1940) 34 Am. J. INT. L. '47; Briggs,
Non-Recognition in the Courts: The Ships of the Baltic Republics (1943) 37 Am. J.
INT. L. 585.
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or conquered State even after the occupation or conquest has been com-
pleted .1
0 2
B. The Act of Recognition
From the viewpoint of the recognizing state too, the act of,recognition
contains a time element; and the often misleading distinction between de facto
and de jure recognition is related to the time concept. Accordingly, these
two types of recognition have recently been defined by the Institute of
International Law by characterizing de facto recognition as the provisional
and de jure recognition as the permanent type of recognition.10 3
Since the recognizing State grants de jure recognition with the intention
of permanency, it has been proposed to consider this act as irrevocable. 0 4
As for the recognized State, de jure recognition implies the expectation on
the part of the recognizing State that the recognized political entity will
last. 05
C. Timh and norms
In international law, as well as in' any other field of law, the time element
is essential in ascertaining the legal validity of international norms and acts.
Thus, time is a significant factor as regards the sources of international law.
The time effect' 0 6 of customary international law, or the "general princi-
ples of law recognized by civilized nations," can hardly be determined with
great exactitude. But international treaties and certain unilateral acts such
as notification include, frequently, definite provisions regarding the time
effect. Some treaties emphasize the "eternal" character while others contain
special clauses concerning their duration, renunciation, or renewal. It is also
obvious that the political effect of international treaties is contingent on
the time factor, because long term agreements are apt to enhance interna-
tional confidence and good faith, whereas short term agreements do pot
'
02For the text of Secretary Stimson's letter to Senator Borah, February 24, 1932,
see 26 AM. J. INT. L. 343 (1932). Cf. also, Point 6 of the Preamble to the Convention
drafted at the Second Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs (Habana, July 24-31,
1941). "That by virtue of a principle of American international law, recognized by
various conferences, the acquisition of territories by force cannot be permitted." (1940)
3 DE'T OF STATE BuLL. 145.
10Cf. Art. 3 of the Resolutions adopted by the Iistitute of International Law, at
Brussels, April 1936. "Recognition is either definite or complete (de jure) or pro-
visional or limited to certain juridical relations (de facto)." Cf. also, Art. 5, Art. 7.
(Supp. 1936) .30 Am. J. INT. L. 185.
104Cf. Art. 5, ibid. "Recognition de jure is irrevocable; it ceases to have effect only
in case- of the definite disappearance of one of the essential elements whose conjunction
was established at the moment of recognition."
105Cf. VERDROSS, V6LCKERRECHT (1937) 140.
106 The term "time effect" refers to the time when a rule of law is effective.
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usually contribute very much to dispelling international distrust and un-
certainty.
Unfortunately, the exact determination of the time effect of international
treaty norms is in general rather difficult.10 7 Even more obscure is the time
effect of international unilateral acts. 0 8 In any case, the prevailing uncer-
tainty as to the actual moment when an international treaty is put into
effect or when such treaty becomes inoperative should not detract from the
basic principle that international norms and acts are limited in time.
'
0TFor this problem, see Deik, Computation of Time in International Law (1926) 20
Ame. J. INT. L. 502. For the time effect of treaties,'see Reiff, The Proclaiming of Treaties
in the United States (1936) 30 Am. J. INT. L. 63.08 See PFLUTGER, DIE EINSEITIGEN RECHTSGESCHAFTE IM V6LKERRECHT (1936) 334.
See also, Eagleton, The Form and Fmnction of the Declaration of War (1938) 32 Am.
J. INT. L. 19.
